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ABSTRACT
An instrumental defense of a right to do wrong is plausible because we cannot directly 
intervene in an individual's choices so as to effectively promote that individual's moral 
good, if her moral good is conceived as being some form of individual autonomy.  An 
epistemic defense is also plausible if we reorient J.S. Mill's epistemological argument for 
his Harm Principle in "On Liberty" to center on the agent's knowledge, rather than on the 
interfering observer's knowledge.  Restrictions on harmless acts that are imposed 
because the acts are wrong are only justifiable to that individual if she herself knows 
that her acts are wrong.  Both approaches depend upon the limited subjectivity and 
fallibility of the agent or interfering observer.  Moreover, both approaches make the 
justification for a right to knowingly do wrong problematic.  
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11 INTRODUCTION
Jeremy Waldron1 identifies an intuition within the domain of moral rights that poses a puzzle 
for philosophers who believe that there is a deep connection between rights and what is 
morally right, or that moral rights should protect only what is morally right.  When confronted 
with what seems to be a wrong act, observers of the act will sometimes judge that "act X is 
wrong..." but then immediately qualify that judgment with a statement like "but you [the agent] 
have a right to do it."  That conjunction leads to what appears to be an intuition of a moral 
right to do moral wrong, which seems illogical and paradoxical.  One also often hears puzzling 
statements like "Your speech is wrong and offensive, but I will defend your right to say it." 
Waldron adduces several examples that raise the intuition of this apparent "right to do wrong" 
(RTDW): a lottery winner gives nothing to charity; an individual works in support of an 
organization with racist leanings; a political campaign worker manipulates simpleminded 
voters; an athlete participates in a race-segregated competition; a man is rude in a railway 
car.  In each case, and in many others like them, the individual agent does something that 
seems to be wrong while also appearing to have a right to do the act free of anyone's 
interference.
I will consider two ways in which such a RTDW might be justified.  First, I will critically 
examine Waldron's specific efforts to provide a rationale for a RTDW.  Waldron's arguments in 
defense of a RTDW fail, but his observations on how rights-claims are justified in general 
suggest an instrumental defense of a RTDW that may succeed.  Second, I will examine 
J.S.Mill's epistemic argument in On Liberty for his Harm Principle, which by its terms may 
2generate a RTDW.  Again, while Mill's specific epistemic argument for the Harm Principle 
largely fails, the failure suggests an epistemic rationale for a RTDW that may succeed.  Both 
the instrumental defense and the epistemic defense ultimately rest on a respect for the 
individual's agency and capacity for reflection and self-determination, and both emphasize the 
individual's freedom to make her own ethically progressive choices.  The instrumental 
approach seeks to protect and promote the individual's freedom to direct her own life; the 
epistemic approach insists that any interferences with her freedom be ones that she would, at 
least in theory, rationally accept.  Both yield a limited RTDW: the individual has a RTDW, so 
long as she does not knowingly commit wrong acts.  I will apply each rationale to the case of 
knowingly doing wrong.  
The instrumental defense of a RTDW begins with the realization that we cannot directly 
intervene in an individual's choices so as to effectively promote that individual's moral good, if 
her moral good is conceived as being some form of individual autonomy.  We are fallible and 
biased, and our direct interventions in an individual's choices are as likely to frustrate as they 
are to promote the individual's moral autonomy.  To mitigate our fallibility and bias, therefore, 
we should instead set up a regime of general moral rights that identifies general classes of 
choices that are important to individual autonomy, and in this way indirectly promote individual 
autonomy.  But since this approach to promoting individual autonomy is indirect, there will 
often be cases where a general moral right protects choices to commit acts that are morally 
wrong for the individual to do.  Individuals would then sometimes have a moral right to choose 
to commit wrong acts, which is a RTDW.  A RTDW, then, is a necessary and perhaps 
unfortunate result of the best instrumental strategy for promoting individual autonomy.  
3The epistemic defense of a RTDW may take two forms.  Firstly, if our justification for 
interfering with an individual's (harmlessly) wrong act is that the act is wrong, then we should 
indeed know that the act is wrong.  If we do not actually know that the act is wrong, either 
because our belief that the act is wrong is not properly justified, or is not true, or is held out of 
piety or rote habit rather than because we believe it is true, then our patent justification (and 
motivation) for interfering with the individual's putatively wrong act fails.  This first epistemic 
strategy for defending a RTDW, however, is less promising that it seems, since in general we 
may be relatively confident that we do have some genuine knowledge of what is morally right 
or wrong to do, even for other people.  The second epistemic strategy is more persuasive: 
We invoke the general and fundamentally liberal principle that any restriction on the freedom 
of an individual must be justifiable to that individual.  That principle requires that if we interfere 
with an individual's act because it is wrong, then in order to justify our interference to that 
individual, the individual must herself know that the act is wrong.  If the individual does not 
know that her act is wrong, either because she does not understand why it is wrong, or 
because it is not in fact wrong, or because she does not care if it is wrong or not, or for some 
other reason, then our interference with her act on the basis of the act's wrongness is not 
justified to her.  The individual has a RTDW, then, when she chooses to do wrong acts, so 
long as she herself does not know they are wrong.  
2 AN INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATION FOR A RIGHT TO DO WRONG
2.1 WALDRON'S JUSTIFICATION FOR A RIGHT TO DO WRONG
4Waldron's justification for "a right to do wrong" (a RTDW) is not a directly instrumental one. 
Waldron does not argue that an agent should have the right to perform wrong acts because 
performing them spurs the agent's moral growth or best leads the agent towards moral 
autonomy, perhaps on the rationale that the agent learns best from making mistakes.2  People 
may or may not learn best by making mistakes, and protecting them in making mistakes may 
lead them to autonomy, but that is not the structure of Waldron's justification for a RTDW. 
Waldron argues, instead, that 1) rights are characteristically "general" in the sense that they 
cover broad ranges of protected action that include acts that are morally right, acts without 
moral import, and acts that are morally wrong; and 2) rights are justified at this general level 
by how they promote an individual's personal integrity or self-definition, or what I will 
henceforth term individual "autonomy."  Waldron does therefore make an instrumental 
argument to justify moral rights at the general level - although alternative ways of justifying 
moral rights may remain open to him - but he makes no direct instrumental argument to justify 
committing wrong acts.  
A RTDW is simply the paradox that seems to result when wrong acts sometimes fall under the 
protections of moral rights, or the apparent paradox in saying that "A is wrong ... but you have 
a right to do it."3  A RTDW is therefore not a general moral right; indeed, a RTDW construed 
as a moral right, rather than as a paradoxical-seeming consequence of the generality of moral 
rights, is probably logically incoherent, as well as unjustifiable.  For such a RTDW would then 
seem to mean "the moral right to do acts that are wrong," and if having a moral right implies 
that interference with its exercise is morally wrong4, then because that interference is itself 
5morally wrong, that interference would be protected under the general moral right to do 
wrong, and "the" RTDW dissolves in self-contradiction.  If we adjust this general RTDW as we 
must to make it coherent, by restricting it to mean "the moral right to do some but not all acts 
that are morally wrong," and specifically exclude moral wrongs that result from interfering with 
moral rights from the set of wrong acts protected by the general RTDW, then we have solved 
the logical problem at the expense of the problem of justifying the RTDW.  For to justify such 
a general RTDW, we would then have to specify the set of wrong acts protected by the 
RTDW, and determine why it protects that set of wrong acts but not others, and how the 
protected wrong acts connect to the integrity/self-definition/autonomy rationale usually 
invoked to justify moral rights.  It is possible that a plausible way to make that connection is to 
argue that sometimes committing wrong acts serves moral autonomy when agents learn from 
their mistakes.  But how are to we to uniquely identify the wrong acts that lead to moral 
learning, so as to pick out and protect only those wrong acts in the RTDW?  It would seem 
that almost any wrong act may lead to moral learning, or may on the other hand just as likely 
lead to moral heteronomy and confusion.  "The right to do wrong acts that lead to moral 
learning" seems much too ambiguous to function properly as a general moral right. 
Moreover, learning from moral mistakes doesn't seem necessary to achieving moral 
autonomy, as coercion into doing right acts may in fact be the best way to guide an agent 
towards moral autonomy understood as doing the right thing for the right reasons.5 
Regardless, Waldron never defends or needs to defend such an unlikely general moral right 
as "the" RTDW.
Waldron does defend a liberal ideal of bold self-determination, self-definition, and personal 
6integrity,6 and he defends moral rights by showing how the protections they afford important 
life-choices serve that liberal ideal.  A particular wrong act may disserve that ideal but 
nonetheless fall under the protection of a general moral right that as a rule does serve it.  For 
example, the traditional liberal moral right of free expression may protect people from 
interference in freely communicating their thoughts and ideas with others because such 
expressive communication is an important way for people to discover and realize truth, which 
allows them to better direct their own lives.  When a person wrongly advocates a racist 
political doctrine, for example, and then perhaps joins a racist organization and shuts out 
other points of view, then probably these acts do not help her achieve individual moral 
autonomy.  Nonetheless her speech is communicative and free and violates no one's rights;7 
and therefore, her speech is probably a valid instance of the right to free expression, which 
does help people to realize truth and autonomy.  Her racist speech and associations are 
probably wrong and even damaging to her moral autonomy, but because the right of free 
expression as a general rule serves her autonomy, it would be morally wrong to interfere with 
her speech, a RTDW.  
The form of Waldron's argument recalls that of rule or "indirect" utilitarianism, which may be 
no accident, as Waldron may be extracting elements of a rule-utilitarian argument for moral 
rights.  Utilitarians are often called upon to defend the principle of utility in the face of 
notorious counterexamples to its apparent application, such as murdering or torturing one 
person in order to save many others.  Rule-utilitarians characteristically respond to such 
counterintuitive outcomes by restricting the utilitarian calculus to a set of utility-maximizing 
rules insulated from the particular acts proposed in the counterexamples.  Rule or indirect 
7utilitarianism then holds that following these rules - which are presumed to largely converge 
upon our familiar moral intuitions - rather than trying to determine in each case how best to 
directly maximize utility, is in fact the best way to maximize utility in the long run because of 
various considerations related to human limitations in acting perfectly morally-rationally. 
Humans cannot possibly calculate every potential effect of their acts (or perhaps such effects 
are intrinsically impossible to calculate because of their complexity) and so they need general 
rules to guide them; and moreover humans are not perfectly morally disciplined; they are 
weak; and without bright, clear rules, fewer people overall will do what generally tends to 
promote utility.  The utility-maximizing moral rules are learned over time and embedded in 
culture, and taught in the nursery, and so do not need to be discovered and tested by each 
individual, as they are already known to us as our moral intuitions.  
But because the rules derive their moral authority ultimately from the principle of utility, they 
are therefore necessarily theoretically defeasible in exceptional cases, and the moral 
permissibility of rejecting, revising or respecifying them - indeed the moral requirement to do 
so - is always a possibility.  Hence an intransigent critic may insist that a particular 
(counterintuitive) case calls for a change or modification to the rules by appealing directly to 
the principle of utility.  Such a critic may observe, for example, that perhaps we should make 
an exception to the rule against torture or murder when that torture or murder would prevent 
the death of a large number of people, since the unrefined rule against murder as applied in 
such cases would not maximize utility.  The point of such criticism is more to object to the 
repulsive callousness of the utilitarian procedure for determining what is moral than it is to 
make any particular moral claim as a counterexample.  To consider trading one life off for 
8another in the utilitarian a way is inherently immoral and corrupting to many such critics;8 
others dispute utilitarian monism and quantitative value commensurability, believing that 
morality is instead pluralistic in such a way as to sometimes or often generate intractable 
moral conflicts in which one does wrong no matter what one chooses.9  Indeed much of the 
motivation for rights stems from objections to the way the utilitarian procedure countenances 
weighing and trading off important interests of individuals as a way of resolving moral 
conflict,10 a problem that rule utilitarianism ameliorates but cannot completely avoid.11  
Just as rule utilitarianism depends upon insulating its general rules from a direct application of 
the principle of utility, so Waldron's instrumental defense of a RTDW depends upon insulating 
general moral rights from a direct consideration of whether individual autonomy (or integrity or 
self-definition) is served or not in a particular instance.  Rather than subjecting each individual 
act to a consideration of whether choosing that particular act serves individual autonomy, we 
identify certain classes of action in which individual autonomy is critically at issue and protect 
those classes of action, which are moral rights.  Within these general classes will inevitably 
exist certain acts that are morally wrong.  But Waldron tends only to describe how justification 
by moral rights in particular cases "usually proceeds,"12 rather than offering an explicit 
argument to defend this partitioning of the justification of moral rights from the justification of 
the acts themselves.  "Characteristically," he says, when considering whether a particular act 
is protected by a moral right, the act is "usually supported by indicating that [the act] A is a 
member of a certain set of actions any of which [a person] P has a right to perform in the 
circumstances."13  And: "the general claim is not inferred ... from the more specific claims," but 
instead "we establish the general claim and then derive the more specific propositions from 
9it."14  Waldron does observe that when disputing whether a moral right exists at the general 
level, "what is defended or contested ... is the claim that choice within a certain range is not to 
be interfered with,"15 and that what is at issue is whether choice in that range is important to 
individual autonomy.  Rights have a "crucial link with the notions of choice and alternatives."16 
But this observation is not an argument for why we should not ask at the level of the particular 
choice whether this particular chosen act serves individual autonomy or not, and so bypass 
the question as to whether the choice is an instance of a general moral right, if it is true that 
moral rights exist to promote autonomy.  If general moral rights are ultimately justified by 
reference to their connection to individual autonomy, then why shouldn't we appeal directly to 
that value when determining whether to interfere in a particular case, rather than engage in 
this roundabout reasoning?  We would then simply ask ourselves, for example: does 
choosing to advocate a racist political doctrine help a person become morally autonomous? - 
no, it probably does not - therefore we may (or even should) interfere.
Waldron offers no explicit answer to this question, though he may implicitly assume that the 
link he sees between choice and autonomy provides a justification for the generality feature of 
rights, and for the insulation he describes between the instrumental justification of moral rights 
by autonomy and the justification of particular choices as instances of those moral rights.  But 
this assumption is ill-conceived.  It may be true that autonomy requires choice.17  Moreover, 
there is a sense in which any choice is "general."  A choice by definition must offer at least 
one option and an alternative; for example, one may join a racist group, or not join it.  If one 
could not choose to join it, or could not choose not to join it, then one has no choice whether 
to join the racist group or not.  And if there are other groups one may or may not join, then 
10
one has a broader or in a sense more general choice of which groups to join and whether to 
join them.  One might think, then, to build up a right like that of free expression or association 
by additively summing together more and more options: the choice to say this or that or the 
other, or not, or to join this group or that group or another group, or not, and so on.  So then 
the generality of the right to free expression or association would be no different from the 
generality of a choice between at least two options (like joining a racist organization or not), 
except that the right of free expression or association would be a choice between a massive 
number of options.18  Since the ideal of individual autonomy requires choice, autonomy 
therefore requires the generality that choices have, and that is what rights protect.    
But this form of additive or iterative generality does not capture the generality of a moral right 
like that of free expression or association, or how such a right's generality connects to the 
ideal of individual autonomy.  For the generality of a right that matters for purposes of 
autonomy, it is not primarily the breadth of a choice that matters, but the significance of the 
options available.  A choice made between a massive range of banal, uncontroversial political 
remarks, though more general in the additive sense, does not matter to individual autonomy 
as much as a single choice to criticize the ruling power or not.  Waldron observes in a slightly 
different context that morally neutral choices, which are often trivial in this way, are those 
"least likely to be regarded as an appropriate subject matter for rights."19  Moreover, the 
iterative generality of a choice does not give any reason for why rights should protect wrong 
options.  While it is true that adding wrong options to a choice would add options and 
therefore make it more general, there is no obvious explanation for why increasing a choice's 
iterative generality in this way proportionally increases the way in which a choice serves 
11
autonomy.  Again, it is possible to add many trivial options to a choice and so make it more 
general without making it any more significant to individual autonomy.  Perhaps reaching a 
threshold number of options is good enough, or even best, for autonomy.  We do know the 
minimum additive generality a choice requires to be a choice, and if autonomy requires 
choice, then autonomy requires this minimum generality, but after that there seems little 
necessary connection between the additive "generality" of choice, and autonomy, and the 
generality feature of a moral right that protects choices between significant (and possibly 
wrong) options.
Waldron does make an argument that if we eliminate all wrong acts from the domain of 
choices protected by moral rights, then rights would protect only a field of enervated choices 
with options insufficient to support individual autonomy.  What would be left, he claims, is 
either a field of (non-)choices to do solely what is right, on the one hand, or on the other hand, 
a similarly fallow field of morally indifferent choices composed of "the banalities and trivia of 
human life,"20 and neither alternative leaves the kind of robust, significant choices that rights 
characteristically protect.  He reaches this impasse by claiming as a premise that whenever 
there is a choice between a morally "called-for" action and an alternative that is morally 
"indifferent," then the alternative indifferent act by that opposition would become an act that is 
not called-for, and therefore, he claims, morally "impermissible."21  For example, if being 
respectful at a funeral is called-for, then being disrespectful is by that opposition a wrong act, 
whereas if being respectful were not called-for, then perhaps being disrespectful would be a 
morally indifferent act.  So if we tried to eliminate all wrong acts from the protections of moral 
rights, then the called-for acts would systematically dominate all morally indifferent 
12
alternatives by converting them into wrong ones (because they are not called-for), leaving a 
field of (non-)choices to do solely what is right.  And if we tried to remedy this problem by also 
eliminating all called-for acts from the protections of moral rights, then there would remain a 
field of only choices between morally indifferent trivialities.  Since neither alternative fairly 
represents the significant moral choices that moral rights protect, rights must of necessity 
protect some wrong acts, Waldron claims.  
Let us try to sort out this argument.  Waldron asserts as a premise that there are only three 
types of moral acts: acts that are morally "required", acts that are morally "prohibited" and 
acts that are morally "indifferent."  Morally "required" acts are acts that are "called for from the 
moral point of view", while acts that are morally "prohibited" are acts that are "subject to moral  
criticism," and finally acts that are morally "indifferent" are acts "on which morality has nothing 
of importance to say."22  But this division is vague and misleading.  He at first appears to seek 
to divide all morality straightforwardly between morally right, wrong and neutral types of acts. 
But within the category of morally right acts, besides acts that are morally "required" 
(Waldron's "called for"), such as keeping a promise to a friend or repairing a harm one 
caused, there are also acts that we are not required to do but that we have some moral  
reason to do, such as being polite to strangers, or respectful at funerals; and within the 
category of wrong acts, besides acts that we have some moral reason not to do, or that are 
"subject to moral criticism" (also Waldron's "prohibited"), such as wasting resources, or being 
rude, there are also acts that we are morally required not to do, such as stealing, or lying, or 
murdering.  There are, therefore, acts that we are morally required to do or avoid, acts we 
have some moral reason to do or avoid, and acts that we are neither morally required nor 
13
have any moral reason to do or avoid.23  Waldron's classification obscures these important 
differences.  For example, while Waldron's category of right acts that are "called for" are all 
morally required, his category of wrong acts that are "prohibited" includes both acts we are 
morally required not to do and acts that we have some moral reason not to do (ambiguously, 
all such "prohibited" acts are "subject to moral criticism").  Waldron entirely omits acts that we 
have some moral reason to do but are not required to do.  This omission allows Waldron to 
argue that right acts dominate neutral acts whenever there is a choice between them; if a right 
act is required, then we are required to avoid an otherwise morally neutral alternative.  But if a 
right act were not required but is only right because we have some moral reason to do it, then 
we would have some moral reason, but no requirement, to avoid an otherwise morally neutral 
alternative, and the right act would not automatically eliminate its neutral alternative.
For Waldron, then, it would seem that it is specifically choices between wrong acts that we 
have some moral reason but no moral requirement to avoid, and neutral acts about which 
morality is silent, that support the robust autonomy that rights protect.24  But this outcome is 
odd and partial.  Is individual autonomy really constituted specifically and only by our choices 
between morally neutral acts and wrong ones we have some moral reason to avoid?  On 
Waldron's account, it is not choices like being charitable or not (since we have moral reason 
to give to charity, to give to charity is therefore "called for" and required, and not a genuine 
choice because we must do it), or choices like driving a car versus walking to work (a choice 
between morally indifferent options that are therefore insignificant), but instead only choices 
between being rude or not, wasting one's money or not, or misleading people or not, etc.
(choices between what we have some moral reason but no requirement to avoid, and what is 
14
arguably indifferently moral) that Waldron claims support the ideal of individual autonomy.  But 
this division seems entirely arbitrary, since it would seem that choices to do what is right but 
not required should be at least as important to establishing one's moral autonomy as choices 
to avoid what is wrong but not morally barred, and Waldron gives no reason for why we 
should close off the possibility of the existence of right acts that we have some moral reason 
but no moral requirement to do.  It may be that morality is strenuous in a way that leaves no 
room to act morally indifferently or morally wrongly and so always yields a definite moral 
requirement, as in some forms of Godwin's act-utilitarianism, but this issue is much broader 
than the one Waldron is discussing here, and makes moral rights that leave any discretion in 
the hands of the individual problematic, not merely rights that leave open the possibility of 
doing wrong.25  Regardless, it seems unlikely that morality would be strenuous on only one 
side, as it were.  If all acts we have moral reason to do are in fact acts we are morally 
required to do (when opposed to indifferent alternatives), then it would seem equally that all 
acts we have moral reason to avoid are in fact acts we are morally required to avoid (with 
indifferent alternatives, again).  Waldron tries to inject just enough strenuousness into his 
argument (by making all right acts required but not making all wrong acts impermissible) to 
get the RTDW outcome he wants.  Moreover, although Waldron argues that doing what is 
morally required is an insignificant (non-)choice because it is required, and choosing between 
morally indifferent options is always a trivial choice, these conclusions don't seem warranted. 
If I choose not to steal when I could easily have done so, such a choice does not seem 
without moral merit, or like a non-choice, despite that I am morally required not to steal.  And 
if I choose to violate expectations and be a philosopher instead of entering the family 
business, it is likely that I would not consider that choice trivial or banal despite it being a 
choice between morally neutral alternatives.  Waldron celebrates how, because of their 
15
"connections with the ideas of choice and of the importance of certain areas of decision," 
moral rights protect both acts that are "stupid, cowardly, tasteless, [and] inconsiderate," as 
well as acts that are "wise, courageous, cultured, compassionate, creative, honest and 
good,"26 and although he involves himself in no contradiction here because on his account 
rights do protect (non-)choices to do the (required) right thing, nonetheless the congratulatory 
tone misleads because it suggests that our choices to do right, which Waldron discounts 
because all are required, are as expressive of the ideal of individual autonomy as are our 
choices to avoid doing what is wrong but not impermissible in the sense of requirement.  For 
Waldron, only the latter kinds of choices matter to the liberal ideal.
So if general moral rights do sometimes protect wrong acts because they protect choices, and 
choices that serve autonomy must include wrong options, then no argument Waldron has 
offered or intimated about choice has established exactly why or how that may be so.  He has 
argued that eliminating choices to do wrong leaves only choices to do right or, instead, only 
morally indifferent choices, but even if that were the case (and it seems not to be the case), 
such choices might nonetheless sometimes promote individual autonomy.  Nor do choices 
that are more additively general because they include more options than others necessarily 
support autonomy any better than choices with fewer options.  Autonomy may seem to 
require a range of significant choices, which may generate a reason for rights to protect such 
choices, but "significant" is too vague a term to suggest any obvious rationale for including 
wrong acts within one's choices.  Why must significant choices include wrong options?  There 
does not seem to be any identifiable mix of morally required, "called-for", or indifferent or 
wrong options, or few or many options, that make some choices significant to individual 
16
autonomy and others insignificant to it.  So what is meant by the generality of the range of 
choices that a moral right protects?  Why are rights general in this way?  
2.2 AN INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE GENERALITY OF MORAL RIGHTS
To be clear on the "generality" of rights again: the structure of Waldron's overall instrumental 
argument for a RTDW is not that certain choices that include wrong acts (or right acts) in 
some way uniquely serve autonomy and so rights protect these choices to commit wrong 
acts; it is instead that certain wrong acts sometimes fall under the general protections that 
rights provide so as to serve individual autonomy.  We do not ask of a particular choice 
whether this choice serves the individual agent's autonomy in this case; instead, we 
determine whether this particular choice falls under the range of choices protected by the 
moral right at issue.  There are always direct instrumental arguments as to why or why not a 
particular choice - of any quality or breadth - might be thought to serve an individual's 
autonomy.  For example, in a particular case - as suggested a few times before - choosing a 
wrong act may be the best way for the agent to grow morally because the agent will best 
learn from making a mistake.  (Marching in a parade with a racist organization, perhaps the 
individual encounters fearful or anxious minority-race children, and comes to understand a 
common humanity.)  Or perhaps instead in a particular case it is better to coerce the agent 
into choosing to do right in the hope that it is by choosing rightly that an agent comes to a 
better understanding of the reasons behind right choices.  (When a lottery winner who has 
never given to charity is forced to do so instead of wasting it on self-indulgences, she sees 
how grateful the people she helped are, and she experiences an outpouring of compassion 
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for them.)  Or perhaps an agent may best learn moral autonomy by being tested with a 
difficult decision to choose right over a tempting wrong.  (A sage goes into the desert and is 
tempted but resists evil.)  Each of these outcomes seems to promote the individual's 
autonomy, yet in one the agent chooses wrong, in another the agent is forced to choose right, 
and in another the agent chooses right over tempting wrong.  Many additional such variations 
are possible, as well.  Yet such instrumental considerations do not seem to matter when we 
are determining whether a particular choice is protected by a general moral right or not, and 
therefore whether it is morally wrong to interfere or not.  Instead, we determine whether the 
choice is protected by asking whether the choice is or is not an instance of the class of 
choices protected by the moral right in question, and if it is, then the choice is protected. 
Indeed, the procedure for protecting a particular choice as an instance of a moral right may 
seem to operate as if the instrumental value of the particular choice to the individual's 
autonomy didn't matter at all.  If we determine that a particular choice is an instance of a 
moral right, then it is protected regardless of whether making the choice appears to serve the 
agent's autonomy or not, and regardless of whether the choice may include a wrong act, right 
acts, indifferent acts, or whatever.  Why might this be so?  
The examples of how particular choices may or may not lead to a realization of individual 
autonomy for the agent demonstrate how difficult it is to determine whether and how making a 
particular choice may figure in an individual's moral development.  It seems difficult to tell 
whether an agent who marches with a racist organization would emerge with more fervor for 
the group's racist doctrine or would instead give it up, or whether coercing an agent to give to 
charity would create a seething resentment or instead an enlightened view, or whether 
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offering a particular agent difficult choices between right and easy, highly rewarded wrong 
options would result in good choices or tragic ones that damage the agent's very capacity for 
moral autonomy.  (The marching demonstrator might find her racist prejudices confirmed; the 
charitable donor might feel bitter if she see her beneficiaries waste her donation; or the sage 
might lose her faith in the desert.)  Even from the agent's own perspective, deciding what is 
right or wrong in a particular case is not easy because one's own choices and motives are 
rarely perfectly clear even to oneself.  Making such determinations for another person would 
seem fraught with many times more uncertainty.
Might such uncertainty provide some moral basis for not interfering with others' choices and 
so for the generality of a moral right?  Recall the rule-utilitarian response to objections rooted 
in some counterintuitive outcomes that arise when directly applying the principle of utility. 
Critics of utilitarianism often point out that some grievous moral wrongs, such as torturing one 
person to save many others, seem sanctioned by the principle of utility.  Rule utilitarians 
respond that 1) limited human beings cannot ever fully or sufficiently know all the effects of 
their actions upon overall utility, and moreover that 2) when given discretion to make such 
determinations, humans are more likely to merely rationalize their own moral weaknesses 
than act so as to promote utility; and therefore, 3) a regime of rules is the best way to 
maximize utility in the long run.  Hence when confronted with a moral decision, an individual 
should determine what rule applies to the case at hand, rather than try to determine how 
one's action would directly affect overall utility, a calculation laden with error and possible 
bias.  These rules do ultimately derive their justification from their tendency to maximize 
collective utility and hence are defeasible in extraordinary cases, but the rules enjoy a strong 
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presumption against their violation, a presumption that is in fact enshrined in moral intuitions.  
Critics of the argument that moral rights instrumentally serve autonomy often proceed in a 
similar way, though their aim is not to raise counterintuitive counterexamples but instead to 
expose internal inconsistencies in the argument that moral rights exist to promote autonomy. 
Such critics often point out that moral rights protect many acts, like demonstrating for a 
noxious doctrine, or hoarding one's money, that are wrong and do not seem to serve an 
individual's moral autonomy at all.  Since most liberals would agree that moral rights protect 
some such activities, however, the point of this objection is to argue that individual autonomy 
must not provide a sufficient basis for an instrumental justification for moral rights.  But a 
response resembling that made by rule-utilitarians is nonetheless available.  A defender of 
moral rights as serving autonomy might argue that 1) human beings are fallible, and therefore 
cannot ever fully know what effects interfering with an agent's acts would have upon that 
agent's individual autonomy; and, moreover, that 2) human beings are morally limited or 
biased as well, and therefore more likely to rationalize interfering with an agent's acts so as to 
reinforce their own moral prejudices than they are to disinterestedly consider how their 
interference might affect or frustrate the agent's autonomy.  Rarely is interfering with another 
person's choices "for her own good" truly for that purpose; instead it is usually a 
rationalization for unwarranted interference with acts a majority finds offensive or distasteful.27 
Such considerations of human fallibility and moral limitation or bias lead to the conclusion that 
therefore 3) a regime of general moral rights that protects harmless moral choices from 
interference better serves individual autonomy than would constantly exposing the particular 
acts of individual agents to the many-sided instrumental tests that fallible, biased observers 
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might impose as to whether that agent's acts serve or disserve that agent's autonomy in each 
case.  Perhaps an omniscient, benevolent God would know precisely when and how to 
interfere with an individual's acts in such a way so as to never frustrate that individual's 
autonomy, but only such a God could fully know precisely what the agent's choices are, what 
they mean, what the agent intends, and who the agent is and how she will react, and 
therefore what the effects of His interference would be upon the agent's developing moral 
autonomy, as well as be certain that His motives were entirely benevolent and His reasons for 
interfering not mere rationalizations.  But human beings are not such gods, and so they are 
better off with moral rights that mark out general classes of choices that are presumed to 
serve individual autonomy, than they are trying to directly evaluate whether a choice serves 
an individual's autonomy in each case in an ad-hoc way.  
Note that this defense of moral rights that protect a RTDW does not imply that moral 
judgment is impossible because human beings can never perfectly know the effects of their 
actions or perfectly understand their own moral motives.  Despite such human limitations, 
people can and often do make morally autonomous choices for themselves.  Nor is the 
argument primarily that an observer cannot possibly know what the agent knows about the 
agent's situation, and that therefore the agent is in the best cognitive position to make a 
decision, although that will usually be true.28  Instead, the argument is that because one 
cannot know these things for certain about oneself and especially about others in a particular 
case, or completely know one's own biases, one therefore cannot reliably know the effects of 
interference upon another individual's autonomy.  Hence a system of moral rights that picks 
out in advance what sorts of acts are important to individual autonomy is necessary in order 
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to effectively protect and promote it.  Human fallibility and bias magnify error when one tries to 
make and enforce moral choices for others.29  While it may be possible to know that a wrong 
act is wrong for an individual, and moreover that our interference would prevent the wrong 
act, we cannot know how our interference would directly affect (or not affect) that individual's 
autonomy to a degree sufficient to justify our interference instrumentally.  By contrast, in the 
case of the agent "interfering" with herself so as to make a choice, there is no such moral 
friction between one's intervention and its effects.  A RTDW therefore depends upon the moral 
distinction between self and other.  In the case of oneself, autonomous moral action is 
possible because, despite not fully knowing the nature of one's own choices or motives, or 
precisely how one's choices will play out, nonetheless there is sufficient knowledge of one's 
choices and motives and the direct effects of one's action on oneself to justify the hope that 
making a certain choice will serve or at least not damage one's own moral autonomy.  If the 
effects of one's moral choices upon one's own life were entirely unknown, then moral choice 
could have no connection with autonomy or self-determination.  Autonomy depends at least in 
part on the expected consequences of one's choices playing out.30  In the case of interfering 
with another individual, the interfering observer's fallibility and bias as to the nature of a 
particular choice, were the observer to make it herself, is multiplied by a further fallibility and 
bias as to the nature of the agent's perspective on the choice, and that further uncertainty will 
almost always make the effects of interference upon an agent's autonomy uncertain.  The 
observer must in a sense model the agent's mind within her own mind, asking not only 1) 
what the observer should do were the observer in the agent's position, and if that is known to 
a fair degree of certainty, then also 2) whether doing that act would be best for the (modeled) 
agent, not the observer, to do in the agent's position, and then further calculating 3) how 
interference would influence the observer were she in the agent's position, and then 4) what 
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influence that interference would have on the (modeled) agent, not the observer, in the 
agent's position, with all of these calculations directed towards determining the potential direct 
effects of her acts of interference upon that particular agent's individual autonomy.31  
Considerations of human fallibility and bias do not imply that interference is always wrong in 
every case, of course.  The argument here applies only when an observer argues that her 
interference is for the agent's own good, or would have no adverse effects upon the agent's 
autonomy.  In cases where autonomy is not at issue, human fallibility and bias are often 
superable.  In easy cases of justifying interference, interference is usually justified by its 
reliable connection to the wrongness of the act and the absence or weakness of competing 
moral values (like individual autonomy, though obviously there are many others).  If an agent 
is doing something wrong, then that always provides a moral reason, and sometimes a moral 
requirement, to interfere with the agent's act.  There may always be some uncertainty as to 
whether an act is wrong for an agent to do, of course, but in easy cases there is little or no 
uncertainty, as for example when an agent attempts to murder an innocent person.  There is 
also always uncertainty as to whether the observer interprets the act correctly, but again in 
easy cases one's interpretation is reliable: perhaps the observer had previously overheard the 
agent planning the murder and then sees the agent attempt it as planned.  Finally, there are 
often competing moral reasons (or requirements) not to interfere, but once again, in easy 
cases there are few such reasons: the observer may prevent the murder by anonymously 
alerting a nearby police officer, for example, rather than endangering herself or anyone else. 
In such easy-interference cases, the observer's fallibility and bias are minimal, and competing 
moral reasons not to interfere, such as endangering other lives, don't exist, and so 
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interference with the attempted crime is both morally justified and here required.  By contrast, 
in more difficult cases of interference, while interference may still justified to the extent it can 
be by the perceived wrong avoided, either the wrongness of the act for the agent is uncertain, 
because the observer is limited or biased in some way, or preventing the perceived wrong 
competes with other important values in such a way as to make interfering morally dubious. 
In the attempted murder example, the agent may in fact be defending herself from the one 
she kills, or perhaps the agent and her "victim" are in fact actors in a street performance-art 
production.  Or perhaps the observer is racially biased and assumes that an agent of a certain 
race must be attempting a murder rather than defending herself.  And even if the agent's 
perception of the situation is accurate and unbiased, no one would blame the observer for not 
risking her own life so as to prevent an armed violent agent from attempting a murder.  Doing 
so would be morally praiseworthy, perhaps, but such supererogatory acts are not morally 
required.  And it would be wrong for the observer to interfere by risking the life of some other 
innocent person so as to prevent the agent's crime.  So while considerations of fallibility and 
bias, and competing moral values, must always be considered in determining whether 
interference is justified, they certainly do not make interference unjustified in every case - only 
in difficult cases of interference might they do so.  The instrumental argument for the 
generality of moral rights presented here is scoped to apply only when an observer interferes 
and argues that her interference would not adversely affect the agent's autonomy, or that 
such interference would be good for the agent's autonomy.  Fallibility and bias in the heat of a 
particular case make such a determination too uncertain to be trusted.  
For example, suppose an agent chooses to join a public march with a racist organization, and 
24
an observer considers stopping the agent.  The observer believes it would be wrong for she 
herself to march, and moreover, that participating in such a march could never serve her own 
autonomy.  These beliefs provide the observer with a moral reason not to herself join the 
march, and to the extent that others are similarly situated, also provide her with a reason to 
interfere with others who choose to march.  The observer values individual freedom and 
autonomy, however, and does not want to interfere with other people if her interference would 
damage their autonomy, so long as the individual agent is not harming anyone.32  To the 
extent that the observer knows the agent here, the observer asks whether it is also wrong for 
that agent to march, or whether the agent may have some special reason to march that is 
unknown to the observer, and whether the agent understands the group's noxious message, 
and then, given the agent's situation, whether marching might nonetheless serve that agent's 
individual autonomy or not.33  Does the agent herself sincerely believe that joining the march 
is morally right, or morally right for her?  If so, then that may be a clue to the observer that the 
agent's autonomy is at issue in a way the observer does not fully understand.  The observer 
must also consider whether her own repugnance at the idea of marching for such a cause 
may influence her conclusions as to whether marching is wrong for the agent, and moreover 
is not expressive of the agent's personal autonomy.  Suppose the observer concludes that 
marching is wrong for the agent, perhaps regardless of what the agent thinks about it, and 
that the observer's own motives in reaching that conclusion are unbiased, and moreover that 
choosing to march will not serve the agent's autonomy.  The observer's conclusion, then, is 
that the agent does not promote her own autonomy by choosing to march, and since the 
march is wrong for the agent, the agent should choose not to march.  But that is not all.  Next 
the observer must consider whether, if she the observer had thought marching was right for 
herself and someone who disagreed had interfered with her marching, then how would she 
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react to that interference?  Would such interference result in a reaction in her that would be 
good or bad for her individual autonomy?  Would she the observer tend to react with more 
strident efforts to march at another time, or in some violent way, or, alternatively, give up on 
political expression forever?  If the observer concludes that such outside-party interference 
would be good for (or not damage) her own autonomy if she were in the agent's place, then 
next she must consider, knowing the agent's personality and life circumstances, whether 
interference would also be good for the agent, or whether she would react in a way differently 
from how the observer imagines she herself would react in the agent's place, such that 
interference would make things worse.  How would the agent react to being stopped?  Would 
she react in the cool, grateful way that the observer imagines that she herself would react? 
Or is the agent intransigent and obstreperous in her views, and so would react in some 
unpredictable negative way?34  The observer must also consider whether her predictions as to 
the agent's reaction upon being stopped are not prejudiced with naive ideas of the agent's 
gratitude at being saved from immorality, or on the other hand, poisoned with thoughts of 
wreaking revenge or just deserts upon those who do what she herself thinks wrong.  If she 
finally concludes that stopping the agent would not adversely affect the agent's own good of 
autonomy, and is correct in all her conclusions, and everything works out as she predicts, 
then perhaps the observer may defend her interference from charges that it impinges upon 
the agent's autonomy by appealing to its direct (non-) effects upon that agent's individual 
autonomy.35  But if the observer is wrong at any step in her chain of inferences and 
conclusions, then her interference with the agent's act is not defensible by such an appeal.
Contrast how efforts to justify interference proceed under a regime of moral rights.  In the 
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case of the marcher again, the observer believes the agent's act is wrong and considers 
whether to interfere.  The observer does not ask whether marching is wrong for the agent, or 
serves or disserves the agent's autonomy; or whether interfering might cause the agent to 
react violently or to become more entrenched in her wrong views.  Instead, the observer 
considers whether the agent's act here is protected under a moral right.  She knows that the 
moral right of free expression protects the free exchange of ideas, and connects with other 
important political purposes in a liberal democracy such as fair elections and rational, 
transparent exercises of public power.  Free expression is moreover closely allied with a 
concomitant right of free association that may also be at issue here.  While marching is not 
literally speech, nonetheless marching as a group to proclaim support for racist policies is a 
potent symbolic act of endorsement for a political doctrine, and is therefore communicative. 
The observer believes the doctrine here is wrong and odious, and thinks marching in its 
support is wrong, but nonetheless she concludes that the march is intended to communicate 
support for a political doctrine and so falls under the protection of the moral right of free 
expression.  Speech protected by a moral right presumptively serves the individual agent's 
autonomy, and the observer concludes that she would violate the individual's autonomy by 
interfering.36  Now suppose that instead of merely marching with the racist group, the agent 
intends to incite the group to burn down targeted churches or synagogues, and suppose also 
that it is likely that if the agent urges angry marchers to burn down her targets, then they likely 
will.  The observer knows that the moral right of free expression does not protect crimes, or 
speech closely related to crimes.  Nor does the right protect speech that incites imminent 
unlawful action, because such speech has little or no connection to truth and the free 
exchange of ideas.37  The observer reasons that while the agent's speech here is indeed 
speech and occurs in the context of a political march, nonetheless the agent's speech seems 
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closely tied to the commission of a crime, and in fact if the agent is not stopped, then the 
crime will likely occur, and moreover more speech would not remedy the situation in time to 
prevent it.  The observer concludes that the agent's speech is therefore not protected, and so 
does not bear on that individual's autonomy.  The observer may therefore morally interfere so 
as to prevent what she believes is a wrong act, without damaging the agent's autonomy. 
While it is possible that inciting the commission of the crime here could serve the agent's 
autonomy in some extraordinary way, and so the observer's interference might ultimately 
frustrate the agent's autonomy, the observer may nonetheless interfere in the confidence that 
the areas in which interference is detrimental to the agent's autonomy have already been 
picked out by moral rights, and moreover that the regime of moral rights protects individual 
autonomy better than would one of ad-hoc determinations.  So long as the observer follows 
the rules laid out by general moral rights, she may be reasonably certain that her acts of 
interference respect the individual agent's autonomy, and moreover are generally undistorted 
by her own prejudices.  
2.3 SOME DISTINCTIONS FROM RULE-UTILITARIAN ACCOUNTS OF MORAL RIGHTS
The partitioned instrumental justification for moral rights described here is not a rule-utilitarian 
account of moral rights, despite the structural resemblances.  It is especially important to keep 
in mind one critical way in which they differ:  While utility-maximizing rules derive their 
instrumental justification from the overall effect that following the rules has on maximizing 
utility collectively, moral rights derive their justification from how they protect and promote the 
autonomy of a single individual.  If moral rights were instead justified primarily by their 
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tendency to promote autonomy overall, in the collective sense that more people would live 
autonomous lives under a regime of moral rights than they would otherwise, then the 
instrumental defense of moral rights offered here would not be a theory of rights, but instead a 
variation on the rule-utilitarian characterization of moral rights as utility-maximizing rules, but 
with autonomy replacing utility.  The spectre of trading off one individual's interest (here, in 
autonomy) for the collective interest (in autonomy), which so plagues rule-utilitarian accounts 
of moral rights, would then arise here.  On such an account, one might plausibly argue that 
sacrificing one individual's autonomy in a particular case so as to promote the autonomy of 
many others would be a good trade overall for autonomy.  Avoiding such outcomes is a 
primary motivation for theories of rights as distinct from any form of utilitarianism.  While it 
may be true that a regime of moral rights would result in more autonomy for more people, we 
must insist that it is the importance of a single individual's autonomy in a particular case that 
is by itself sufficient to instrumentally justify respecting that individual's moral rights.  This 
insistence bars trading-off.  
Making that insistence may seem to weaken the rationale for the partitioning of the 
instrumental justification of moral rights, however.  It may seem as though it would be easier 
to know the effects of one's interference upon a single individual's autonomy as opposed to 
predicting those effects upon a complex collective, as in rule utilitarianism.  Perhaps if it were 
possible to know for certain and without bias that the direct effects of a particular intervention 
would not damage or would in fact promote an individual's autonomy in a specific case, then 
that interference may be justified even if it violated a moral right.  Such an outcome may be 
an inevitable result of the partitioning strategy, as no such strategy can be entirely immune to 
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attacks upon the rationale for the partitioning itself.  But if so, then that outcome is not 
primarily a result of the individualism of the instrumental justification of rights.  While 
maximizing utility in a particular individual's case may seem relatively easier to control despite 
human limitations when compared with maximizing utility across an entire collective of people, 
maximizing individual autonomy in a particular case is by contrast not so easy to control, even 
when compared with maximizing autonomy across a collective.  It may in fact be easier to 
make general assumptions about how autonomy works for people abstracted from their 
circumstances than it would be to make such assumptions about any specific individual as 
enmeshed in her peculiar life circumstances.  Indeed, moral rights that in general promote 
autonomy seem easier to identify than what specific intervention in a particular idiosyncratic 
case would best serve an individual agent's autonomy, or whether that specific intervention 
would damage that individual's autonomy.  It seems easier to see how the right of free 
expression in the abstract helps people lead autonomous lives than it does to see specifically 
how an individual should express herself, or what the individual should express, towards the 
same end.  Regardless, however, identifying what choices and acts would best lead to 
individual autonomy seems considerably more difficult than identifying what choices and acts 
would maximize individual utility,38 and so problems of fallibility and bias in directly promoting 
individual autonomy are not avoidable simply because we are concerned with the individual 
rather than a collective.
The usual rule-utilitarian response to rule-violating counterexamples in which the critic argues 
that the direct effects of a particular act upon collective utility are fully and easily determined, 
is that the critic ignores the negative effects that violating the rule will have upon utility.  Since 
30
the rule generally tends to increase overall utility, weakening it will tend generally to decrease 
utility, and violating the rule will weaken its habitual, intuitive hold upon people's behavior. 
Telling a lie, for example, may maximize utility within the scope of a particular extraordinary 
case, but if lying becomes so widespread as to no longer feel intuitively wrong to most people, 
then utility will greatly decrease overall.  So the question is then whether telling a lie in a 
particular case will indeed generate such widespread effects.  This rule-utilitarian response is 
also available in response to a similar attack upon the partitioned instrumental justification of 
rights, with some qualifications.  Although the partitioned instrumental defense of moral rights 
is rooted in the value of each individual's autonomy taken one at a time, rather than in the 
collective value of the autonomy of many individuals, nonetheless habits and intuitions that 
respect moral rights serve to protect a particular individual's autonomy in a particular case 
equally as well as such habits will serve to promote autonomy in the collective.  If the 
observer has accurate intuitions as to when her interference might tread upon an individual's 
moral rights, and habits of avoiding interference in the areas that moral rights mark out, then 
she is less likely to indulge biased desires to interfere with an individual's autonomy in a 
particular case, or to engage in fallible, biased chains of reasoning as to whether her 
interference truly affects a particular individual's autonomy or not.  Hence protecting intuitions 
and habits of respecting moral rights is as important for the instrumental theory of moral rights 
rooted in a single individual's autonomy as protecting the intuitions supporting the rules is for 
a rule-utilitarian theory rooted in collective utility.  A critic who argues that the direct effects of 
interference upon a particular individual's autonomy are fully known and innocuous must still 
then also argue that violating that individual's moral rights would not weaken the moral 
intuitions and habits that protect moral rights in such a way so as to endanger another 
particular individual's autonomy in the future; in other words, she must argue that taking a 
31
direct instrumental approach is superior to taking an indirect approach that prizes general 
moral rights.  Moreover the instrumental defense of rights may avail itself of the collective 
good rationale in a subsidiary way, so long as the interest of individuals taken one at a time is 
understood to take lexical priority: there will be fewer violations of individual autonomy and 
therefore more autonomous people under a regime of moral rights than there would be under 
a regime of ad-hoc determinations.  That is not an insignificant collective good, though it is a 
subsidiary rationale for respecting moral rights.  
Critics of rule-utilitarianism typically rejoin the attack from there, however, and argue that rule-
utilitarianism should therefore endorse covert violations of the rules, since such violations 
would not broadly affect moral intuitions or habits, an outcome that may seem even more 
morally outrageous.39  Such critics seek to broaden the attack from one on the counterintuitive 
outcomes of rule-utilitarianism to an attack on the counterintuitiveness of the rule-utilitarian 
procedure itself for determining what is moral.  A utilitarian procedure that would not, for 
example, reject outright the morality of harvesting one person's organs to save many others, 
but instead must consider whether harvesting organs behind closed doors would not weaken 
the moral rules overall, is not a moral procedure, argues the critic.  The partitioned 
instrumental account of moral rights is not open to the analogous broadened attack, however, 
because of its insistence on the primacy of the individual's autonomy as the source of value. 
If a direct intervention would negatively impact an individual agent's autonomy, then that 
intervention can never be justified by an appeal to its subsidiary effects or non-effects upon 
the intuitions that support moral rights because those intuitions are ultimately rooted in the 
unique value of that single individual's autonomy.  If on the other hand the critic argues that in 
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a particular hypothetical case we can be absolutely certain that interference will serve or will 
not damage an individual's autonomy, despite the fact that the interference violates an 
important general moral right, and moreover that the effects of violating the moral right would 
not weaken its supporting intuitions, then the instrumentalist defender of moral rights must 
concede that the interference is justified.  But such a concession does not lead to any sense 
of a morally outrageous outcome such as when one person's interests are traded-off for the 
interests of many others.  In such a case the individual's autonomy is stipulated to be 
protected and promoted, and that is the ultimate goal of the instrumental account of moral 
rights.  Indeed such a hypothetical case, if it is not entirely unique, may in fact be a legitimate 
one for a respecification of the relevant moral right.
2.4 A RIGHT TO KNOWINGLY DO WRONG
Consider the following amplifications of some of the wrong acts that Waldron originally 
adduces:
1. a lottery winner conspicuously wastes her winnings in front of desperately needy 
people
2. an individual works in support of an overtly racist organization 
3. a highly-paid political lobbyist manipulates simpleminded voters to support a cause 
the lobbyist herself thinks is immoral
4. an athlete takes part in competition with representatives of a racist state because 
many other athletes have refused to participate, which increases her chances of 
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winning
5. a man jeers at someone who is depressed or recently bereaved
In Waldron's original examples, whether the agent herself knows her act is wrong is uncertain; 
but in these amplifications, the agent appears to know her act is wrong and does it anyway, 
either for reasons not directly related to the act's wrongness, or for the very reasons that 
make the act wrong, such as because it is selfish or cruel.  The moral intuition of a RTDW 
begins to break down in such cases.  When confronted with the question as to whether 
agents in these amplified cases have a moral right to do their wrong acts, we are tempted to 
ask for further clarification: does the agent indeed know that her act is wrong, as the cases 
seem to suggest?  For example, does the lottery winner realize that the people who see her 
indulging herself are needy?  Does the insensitive man know that the person he mocks is 
depressed or bereaved?  If the agent does know her act is morally wrong, then her demand to 
be free to perform a wrong act because she has a moral right seems somehow hypocritical or 
disingenuous, and the intuition of the agent's moral right to do wrong seems to break down. 
But why should the agent's knowledge of the wrongness of her act matter?  If the agent has a 
moral right to perform an act, then why does the agent's intention or belief as to whether that 
act is wrong matter?  If the agent's belief does matter, then why does it matter?  
2.4.1 CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
J.S.Waldron sometimes speaks as if an agent could never logically do what she believed to 
be morally wrong: "there is something odd about having the intention to do A and sincerely 
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believing that A is wrong."40  But people do sometimes intentionally do what is morally wrong, 
usually for some nonmoral reason related to profit or pleasure; indeed, several of Waldron's 
own examples of a RTDW seem squarely cases in which the agent probably believes her act 
is wrong: a lottery winner gambles and drinks all her winnings rather than donating some 
portion to charity, no doubt because she would rather indulge her pleasures than do what she 
believes is morally right; an athlete participates in a sports competition with a racist state 
because the athlete has invested time in training and wants to win an award, despite knowing 
her participation is wrong.41  In both cases, the agent would probably admit that she was 
doing something wrong but that her nonmoral reasons for action (pleasure, status, etc) are 
more important to her: "I know my act is wrong, but it's within my rights, and I'm doing it 
anyway."  And outside the domain of wrongs that may be protected by rights, the existence of 
explicitly criminal intent is mundane: lying to sell products, embezzling or stealing for gain, 
murdering out of hate or fear, etc.  There are perhaps libertine philosopher-criminals like the 
Marquis de Sade who coolly commit crimes while maintaining a lively skepticism as to moral 
knowledge and truth, but most criminals probably don't consider such issues and instead do 
what they believe but don't care is morally wrong as the opportunity for personal gain arises.  
Waldron's discussion often seems to flow from a paradigm case in which the agent is 
presumed to mistakenly and innocently believe that her act is not wrong, while the observer 
knows the act is wrong yet is morally bound to avoid interfering, saying to the agent, "Action A 
is wrong ...but you have a right to do it."42  Yet Waldron's conceptual analysis, which 
demonstrates that an action's wrongness does not by itself entail that the agent has no right 
to do it, leaves open analytical space for the possibility of the agent making the observer's 
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assertion on her own behalf:  "Action A is wrong ... but I have a right to do it."  Waldron never 
explicitly discusses whether an agent's malicious intention to do wrong matters as to whether 
that agent has or can have a RTDW or not.  Waldron does observe that, pragmatically, when 
someone asserts that they have a right to do A, they often intend to do A, and if it seems 
semantically odd to intend to do something one believes is wrong, then asserting a right to do 
A while believing A is wrong - a RTDW - also seems odd in its turn.43  It may be thought that 
since to assert that something is wrong entails that one should not do it, or that the agent 
should in a sense "interfere" with her own doing of the wrong act, while to assert a moral right 
to do the act is to assert that interference with the agent's doing of the act is morally 
impermissible; then one could not both assert that one should oneself interfere with the act 
and that interference with the act is morally impermissible.  But the agent's moral right to do A 
entails only the moral impermissiblity of others' interfering with A; while the agent's belief that 
A is wrong entails only that the agent should not do (should "interfere" with) her act A:
(1) If I sincerely believe that A is morally wrong, then (2) I should not do A.
 If I should not do A, then (3) I should "interfere" with my own doing of A.
(4) If I have a moral right to do A, then (5) others should not interfere with my doing of 
A.  
"I should interfere with my own doing of A" (3) is not logically incompatible with "others should 
not interfere with my doing of A" (5).  The fact that I should restrict my own doing of A does not 
imply that others morally may interfere with my action.  A moral right to do wrong therefore is 
not conceptually incompatible with the agent's belief that her act is wrong, unless there is no 
significant moral difference between the agent and observers of her action.  
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If I suffered from a mild Freudian schizophrenia of moral conscience and were speaking to a 
Superego observer of my immoral act within my own mind, then I could not coherently sustain 
both a belief in the moral wrongness of A and a moral right to do A as against my Superego 
self.  To assert a moral right to do my iniquitous act A as against myself-as-Superego is to 
assert that I-as-Superego should not interfere with my act.  I believe my act is wrong; I am 
Superego; I-as-Superego believe my act is wrong.  But if I-as-Superego believe my act is 
wrong, then that implies that Superego should avoid the act herself when situated similarly to 
me, and since Superego is situated similarly (indeed, is identically situated) because she is 
me, then I-as-Superego should interfere with my act.  I therefore both should and should not 
interfere with my act, a contradiction.  (A similar contradiction results if we start with Ego 
believing the act is wrong:  My act is wrong; I should not do the act; I should interfere with my 
doing of the act.  I have a moral right to do the act; Superego therefore should not interfere 
with the act.  Since I am Superego, therefore I should and should not interfere with my act.) 
This analysis is mildly risible, of course; however, it does sharpen an important premise 
behind any moral theory of rights that protects a RTDW: the moral difference between self 
and other, i.e. that the morality one enforces against oneself, even if thought to apply 
generally, is not thereby automatically enforceable as against other people.  Waldron notes 
the importance of this premise to a RTDW as well, though he does not observe how a RTDW 
becomes actually conceptually incoherent were we to abandon it.  By contrast, note that it is 
conceptually possible to assert a moral right against myself so long as I do not think that my 
act is wrong in either (or both) of my Ego or Superego roles:  I-as-Ego assert a moral right; I-
as-Superego therefore should not interfere with my act.  I believe my act is not wrong; I-as-
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Superego believe my act is not wrong.  Superego morally may allow herself to do the act 
when situated similarly to me; Superego is situated identically; therefore I-as-Superego 
morally may allow myself to do the act.  That Superego morally may allow the act does not 
contradict that Superego morally should not interfere with it.  While moral rights to do acts that 
are not wrong do not conceptually depend upon there being significant moral differences 
between self and other, RTDWs do.  This difference between self and other creates a moral 
friction associated with interference that exists independently of other moral considerations. 
A RTDW is therefore not logically paradoxical or conceptually incoherent even when the 
agent herself believes her act is wrong, but is a RTDW where the agent does wrong 
intentionally unjustifiable?  As noted earlier, Waldron's discussion seems to flow from a 
paradigm case in which the agent mistakenly does what an observer knows is wrong, though 
some of his leading examples of a RTDW strongly suggest the agent's awareness of the 
wrongness of her act.  Does Waldron's own general justification of a RTDW preclude cases 
where the agent acts while knowing44 that her act is wrong?  
2.4.2 INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATION
The partitioned instrumental justification for moral rights may seem to justify a RTDW even in 
cases in which the wrong act is committed knowingly, because the justification for the 
generality of moral rights is rooted in the uncertainty of the direct effects of interference, and 
we cannot know whether an act committed even with awareness of its wrongness may 
ultimately serve an individual's autonomy or not.  But this conclusion is premature.  The 
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reason for partitioning the instrumental defense of a RTDW is that human fallibility and bias 
make the direct effects of interfering with an agent's wrong act upon that agent's autonomy 
too difficult to determine.  The most difficult determinations to make for an observer seeking to 
calculate the effects of interference upon an agent's autonomy lie in how the agent's 
perspective on her own good may significantly differ from what the observer imagines that 
good to be, because the agent's circumstances and perspective differ from the observer's 
perspective.  They are different people, and the observer's perspective clouds her vision of 
what she imagines is the agent's good, and therefore how interference would affect the 
agent's autonomy.  If the agent thinks that what she does is right, or at least not wrong, and 
moreover thinks doing it is important to her own individual autonomy, then it is more likely 
(though of course not certain) that the observer is mistaken or biased as to whether the act is 
indeed wrong and contrary to the agent's own good, either because the observer discerns an 
independent standard of morality only darkly, or because the observer has overlooked 
something significant in the agent's peculiar circumstances.  Even if the observer is correct 
and unbiased as to the act's wrongness for the agent, then for the same reasons, the 
observer may still nonetheless be mistaken or biased as to how the act may figure in the 
agent's autonomous development.  If the agent insists that doing the (wrong) act is important 
to her autonomy, then that is also evidence that the observer may be missing something 
important.  Finally, the agent's reactions to the observer's interference are much more likely to 
be indignant and counterproductive if that agent believes her act is right (or not wrong) and 
important to her autonomy, and indeed that the interfering observer has morally wronged her. 
For example, suppose an observer thinks homosexual relations are morally wrong and 
considers interfering with an agent's marriage to a same-sex partner.  The agent believes that 
being gay is not wrong and that her marriage is important to her autonomy.  Such agent 
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responses are clues that the observer may not understand the agent's own good properly, 
perhaps because the observer could not imagine same-sex attractions, or because the 
observer has no experience with gay people, or because the observer finds homosexual 
relations repugnant.  So the observer may either be in error about the agent's own good, or 
she may herself be biased in her own experience.  Moreover, even if the observer's 
interference were justified, and she did interfere with the marriage, the agent would likely 
react in an indignant way that would cut against the observer's intentions or expectations.
But if on the other hand, the agent herself believes her act is wrong, and even that doing the 
act would damage her individual autonomy, or at least not serve it, then these facts, if known 
to the observer, provide evidence that there are no significant errors or bias in how the 
observer perceives the agent's own good and her perspective on it.  Of course the agent may 
herself be wrong about her own good, and indeed that is the usual rationalization for 
interfering with an agent, but in the case where the agent herself believes her act bad for her 
autonomy and wrong, then error or bias seems less likely.  Wrong acts are usually tempting 
when they are right from the point of view of self-interest: one is either a fool or a knave, as in 
Glaucon's challenge to Socrates in the Republic.45  In such cases, agents have a strong 
motive to deceive themselves and others into believing that their acts are in fact right, or at 
least not wrong.  But when the agent herself believes her act is wrong and not good for her 
autonomy, then it seems less likely that she is deceiving herself, and so the agent's admission 
of her act's wrongness and wrongness for her autonomy constitutes strong evidence that the 
observer's belief that the agent's act would not serve the agent's autonomy is correct.  Agent 
and observer are here in accord, while it is the differences between them that generate 
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mistake and bias in the observer.  Finally, when an agent confesses to wrongness in this way, 
then the observer's interference may have more predictable effects upon the agent's 
autonomy.  The agent may in fact be confessing her weakness and indirectly asking the 
observer for help.  For example, consider the case of an agent who is a recovering alcoholic 
who sits down at a bar and orders a drink.  An observer, who is the agent's friend and knows 
of a public commitment the agent made to avoid drinking, considers interfering.  The observer 
knows the agent believes drinking is wrong and bad for her, and it is the fact that the agent 
herself believes it wrong that makes the observer's desire to interfere unlikely to rest upon 
errors as to the agent's own good, or on the observer's own moral bias against drinking if it 
exists, and moreover her interference is much more likely to be good for the agent, and 
ultimately (eventually) greeted with the agent's gratitude.  But if the observer does not know 
the agent and merely suspects that she is an alcoholic, and moreover the observer has strong 
biases against drinking perhaps because the observer is herself a recovering alcoholic, while 
the agent by contrast is unconcerned about it, then the effects of interference upon the 
agent's autonomy seem quite unpredictable.  Or suppose a secret homosexual relationship is 
ongoing between two priests who had previously sworn oaths of chastity, and they each 
believe it wrong, and are in fact members of a support group intended to help priests avoid 
sexual temptations; then an observer who was also a priest and fellow member of the support 
group would be less likely to damage the agents' autonomy by discreetly interfering.  It is 
possible, of course, that in such cases both agent and observer are mistaken or biased as to 
whether the act is bad for the agent's autonomy; and therefore it would be wise for the 
observer interested in advancing individual autonomy to interfere only when interference 
seems necessary to avoid serious harm to the agent's autonomy, even in cases when the 
agent herself admits wrongness and weakness.  The agent's admissions here are not 
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conclusive evidence that interference would not damage her autonomy; they are merely 
strong evidence for that conclusion.  
Hence in general the better the observer knows the agent and the agent's understanding of 
the good and of her own good, the better are the observer's chances of being correct in her 
judgments about what is good for the agent's autonomy, and specifically whether interference 
in a particular case would be good for an agent's autonomy.  Moreover the more in accord are 
the agent and observer in their general moral outlook, the less of a chance there is that the 
observer's bias will influence her judgment as to the effects of interference upon the agent's 
autonomy.  In general when the agent herself believes her act is wrong and moreover admits 
it is not good for her own autonomy, then the observer who agrees with these beliefs is in a 
much better position to justify interfering in a way that promotes or avoids damaging the 
agent's autonomy.
3 AN EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR A RIGHT TO DO WRONG
"[The Harm Principle is] that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.  He 
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, 
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be 
wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning 
with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting 
42
him with any evil in case he do otherwise.  To justify that, the conduct from which it is 
desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else." (On Liberty, 
48).  
Because Mill's Harm Principle forbids interfering with an agent's act even when the observer 
believes that the agent's act is wrong, the Harm Principle may assert a RTDW.  I will frame 
Mill's arguments in On Liberty for the Harm Principle in the context of a RTDW and moral 
rights, rather than as adjuncts of an ethical theory such as Mill's rule-utilitarianism.  I do not 
believe that this way of framing Mill's argument, however, distorts either his explicit text or the 
argument's conceptual structure.  It is of course possible to interpret Mill's argument in the 
more straightforward utilitarian way: a right to liberty is instrumentally valuable because 
freedom of thought and action leads to the discovery of truth, which is valuable to all humanity 
as a collective.  There is support for this interpretation in Mill's text; for example, when Mill 
remarks that "the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the 
human race... of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth..."46  The argument is not 
convincing, however, since it is doubtful empirically whether freedom of thought and action 
generally or usually (or ever) leads to the discovery of moral truth.  Moreover, if a truth is 
discovered, then this utilitarian argument anyway does not seem to provide any reason not to 
enforce that truth on everyone.  It would seem that if liberty is a means to truth, then if the 
truth is known, then the means to it would become no longer necessary.  (And Mill does not 
skeptically claim that we know nothing.)  Yet the various restatements of the Harm Principle47 
and Mill's defenses make it clear that Mill believes the right to liberty survives the unearthing 
of truth, even to the point of a RTDW.  So if Mill does espouse the collectivist utilitarian view, 
something else must be doing the work that yields the Harm Principle and a possible RTDW.  
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Mill divides his main thesis in On Liberty into three sections48 by noting that, when an 
observer interferes with an agent, either 1) the agent's act is not morally wrong (and possibly 
is morally right) and the observer is mistaken, or 2) the agent's act is morally wrong and the 
observer is correct, or 3) the agent's act is partly wrong and partly right and the observer is 
similarly partly right and partly wrong.  Mill here implicitly assumes that the agent herself 
believes her act is not wrong and, moreover, that the observer's motive in interfering with the 
agent's act is the wrongness of the act.  Mill argues in the first division49 - where the interfering 
observer is mistaken that the agent's act is wrong - that while observers typically presume 
that they know that an agent's act is wrong, that assumption cannot be certain, and has in 
salient history50 often proved false, and therefore there is always this possibility that the 
observer is mistaken and the agent's act is in fact not wrong.  The interfering observer is 
fallible because she is human and may therefore be incorrect, but more importantly for Mill, 
the observer's belief that the agent's act is wrong is not genuine knowledge unless the 
observer's belief is held with an acute awareness of its fallibility.  That awareness of fallibility 
requires inter alia that the observer allow the agent the liberty to propose and experiment with 
what seems morally wrong to the observer.51  If the observer instead suppresses the agent's 
(harmlessly) wrong act, then the observer implicitly asserts that her own knowledge of the 
good is infallible and that she need not submit it to any challenge.52  Such assertions are 
insufficient justification for interfering.  Mill argues in the second division53 - where the 
interfering observer is correct that the agent's act is wrong - that if opposing ways of life are 
never proposed and tested but are instead suppressed, then the observer's knowledge of the 
moral good, even if correct, lacks the distinctive liveliness and clarity of knowledge, and the 
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observer's belief is in fact not like knowledge at all but instead more like dogma or prejudice. 
If the observer does not know why or how an act or way of life that she believes is morally 
wrong is wrong, then even if she is serendipitously correct in her belief, that belief is not 
genuine knowledge54 of the moral good for the agent, and her interference with the agent on 
the basis of knowing the agent's good is unjustified.  Finally, in the third division55 - where 
agent and observer are each partially right and partially wrong, though each believes herself 
wholly correct - Mill argues that when the observer interferes with the agent's act, the 
observer disrupts the dialectical process essential to acquiring fallible human knowledge of 
the moral good, and so both cuts herself off from knowing the full truth while also poisoning 
what partial knowledge she has.  The observer should instead allow the agent's (partially) 
wrong act because it is only through an interplay between contesting ideas that a full 
knowledge of what is morally good may then emerge.  (It is possible to interpret this third 
division of Mill's argument as a summary statement of his underlying epistemology, rather 
than merely another analytical possibility.)  Hence whether the observer is mistaken, correct, 
or partially correct that the agent's act is morally wrong, that observer may not justifiably 
interfere with the agent's harmless act on the basis of her fallible knowledge that the agent's 
act is morally wrong.  To interfere with an agent's harmless act because the observer believes 
it to be wrong, even in cases where the observer is correct (Division II), vitiates the observer's 
knowledge of its moral wrongness and invalidates the justificatory basis of her interference. 
The agent, therefore, has a right to do wrong.  
Although Mill here makes an explicitly epistemological argument for moral rights in On Liberty 
for the Harm Principle, the more usual way to interpret his defense of the Principle in a 
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context of moral rights is that it establishes a general moral right to liberty that is 
instrumentally valuable because it protects and promotes individual autonomy, which is 
uniquely valuable in maximizing overall utility.  Such an approach has the advantage of 
harmonizing Mill's thought in On Liberty with that in Utilitarianism, as well as avoiding the 
problem of explaining how the epistemic grounds for a right to free expression also extend to 
support a right to autonomy,56 since the approach instead puts autonomy on its own footing as 
a higher-order value.  Moreover, there is considerable textual support, especially in Mill's 
Chapter 3, "Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being," for considering autonomy 
to be of special worth to Mill, as for example when Mill bemoans that "individuality," by which 
he means individual autonomy and not mere eccentricity or difference, is rarely recognized as 
having any "intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account."57  The argument is 
that protecting individual autonomy is critical to maximizing utility either or both because each 
individual is empirically the best judge of her own good58 or because the individual's interest in 
her own autonomy is a "higher-order" utility that "gathers feelings around it so much more 
intense than those concerned in any of the more common cases of utility, that the difference 
in degree... becomes a real difference in kind."59  Mill is also sometimes thought to defend the 
idea that diversity is intrinsically more valuable than uniformity, or that liberty is a precondition 
for the emergence of the man of genius romantically idealized in the 19th C.60  These 
arguments are no doubt present in Mill's thought, but I will for the most part avoid them so as 
to sharpen his epistemological argument, which it seems to me has been given short-shrift. 
Where Mill's epistemological argument has been addressed, Mill is sometimes presumed to 
offer a skeptical account of the possibility of knowledge of moral truth, or to offer a relativist 
theory of truth.61  Mill's empiricism is well-known, but his theory of knowledge is mostly 
imputed from his conclusions, rather than explicit.  While it is possible that Mill had no 
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defensible theory of knowledge guiding his thesis, I will consider some of the possibilities for 
such an argument that Mill at least suggested.  
Mill's epistemological argument seems to be that if the observer's justification for interfering 
with an agent's act is that the observer knows the act is wrong, then the observer should 
indeed know that the agent's act is wrong; otherwise the observer's justification (and probably 
her motivation) for interfering fails.  The observer's justification for interfering may fail at 
succeeding points, as well, of course - for example, if her interference would result in a net 
harm, or for the instrumental reasons discussed earlier - but as an initial matter, the observer 
must at least know the act is wrong, if that is her justification for interfering.  Mill then argues 
that when the observer interferes with an agent, that very interference vitiates the observer's 
knowledge in various ways.  Since Mill is making an epistemic argument, a good way of 
thinking about his three divisions may be to think of them as various ways that the interfering 
observer fails to establish crucial elements of her knowledge of the agent's act's wrongness. 
The classical formula for knowledge is "justified true belief," which in the light of Gettier 
problems is better thought to specify some necessary conditions for knowledge rather than 
jointly sufficient conditions.62  I will consider these necessary elements as well as discuss 
some other important epistemic concerns.  
3.1 TRUTH AND FALLIBILITY
Mill's first division, then - where the observer is mistaken that the agent's act is wrong - seems 
concerned primarily with fallibility, or with how an observer's belief may fail to be knowledge 
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because the belief is not true.  If the observer's belief that an agent's act is wrong is not true, 
then the observer does not know that the agent's act is wrong, and since the observer is 
fallible, there is always a chance that the observer's belief may not be true.  If I believe that 
you are breaking and entering a home at night and I stop you, but in fact you own the home 
and have merely misplaced your keys, then I don't know that your breaking into the house is 
wrong, because my belief is not true, and my interference to prevent your breaking into the 
house is therefore not justified.  (If you proved to me that you owned the home, then both my 
justification and my motivation to interfere would disappear.)
But the mere fallibility of our knowledge does not imply that we know nothing.  While there is 
always a chance that whatever we take to be true is in fact false, as for example in the 
perennial hypothetical case of the Cartesian evil demon who deceives us at every turn, only 
an epistemological skeptic would deny that we have knowledge on the basis of this bare 
theoretical possibility of error.63  Mill is not an epistemological skeptic, and he responds to this 
obvious point by conceding that while we must assume our opinion to be true despite its 
fallibility for the guidance of our own conduct, nevertheless when we suppress others' 
incorrect opinions and wrong acts, we invalidate our assumption of (fallibly known) truth and 
instead assume our own infallibility.  "Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our 
opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and 
on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being 
right."64  When we don't allow others the complete liberty to disagree and act accordingly, 
then, Mill argues, we are implicitly assuming that no challenge to our belief can ever be 
successful, and therefore that we are infallible with regard to that belief.  Being open to such 
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challenges, no matter how much evidence has already been accumulated, or how sure one is 
of the truth of one's belief, is what it means to admit to the fallibility of one's knowledge.  Even 
Newton's physics remains open to challenge in this way.65  "It is not the feeling sure of a 
doctrine which I call an assumption of infallibility... it is the undertaking to decide that question 
for others, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side."66  
But even if the fallibility of knowledge requires that a knower always be open to new evidence 
telling against one's view, Mill's argument here does not explain why the observer's fallibility 
entails that she tolerate the agent's various wrong views and actions if the observer has 
already considered and rejected the views the agent proposes.  The observer's fallibility may 
entail that the observer remain open to the possibility that her own belief may be revised, 
according to her own best judgment, but that does not mean that the observer must tolerate 
views that she already knows are wrong, or listen to arguments that she has already 
evaluated and dismissed.  If the agent asserts and acts on a doctrine that the observer 
(fallibly) knows is wrong, then the observer may still fallibly know the doctrine is wrong even 
as she interferes with it.  Mill may argue that the observer can never truly evaluate whether a 
doctrine or act that she has rejected for herself is also wrong for the agent, because the 
observer cannot ever be completely aware of all agent-relative reasons for action.67  But this 
argument seems to depend on the contentious empirical assumption that the agent always 
knows her own circumstances best, and moreover does not seem to be an argument about 
the fallibility of the observer's knowledge so much as whether the observer may fruitfully apply 
her knowledge of what is morally good to others, an argument considered in Part II supra.  
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Perhaps Mill is making a more subtle epistemological point here about truth, bearing more on 
what sort of "belief" is proper to knowledge, rather than on the banal possibility that a belief 
may be in error.  Knowledge does not require simple belief, but specifically the sort of belief 
that is accepted for the purpose of acquiring truth and avoiding error.68  If someone believes 
that Neil Armstrong walked on the moon only because she likes the fanciful idea of it, and not 
because she cares whether it is true or not, then she (arguably69) does not know that 
Armstrong walked on the moon because she does not accept it for the purpose of acquiring 
truth and avoiding error, even if her belief is justified (perhaps because she saw a video of the 
moon-landing on television).  She accepts the information because it suits her fancy, and so 
she is not sure whether her belief is true or not, nor does she care, although she does believe 
the moon landing happened.  For this reason, she may hesitate to communicate her belief to 
others, or to rely on her belief "for purposes of action."70  She may for example hesitate to 
challenge someone who falsely asserts that the moon landing was a hoax.  Her belief is 
therefore not the sort of belief necessary for knowledge.  Is Mill arguing that when the 
observer refuses to tolerate dissenting views that the observer must therefore be holding her 
belief for some reason other than because the belief is true?  For the observer to know the 
agent's act is wrong "for purposes of action," the observer must believe that her belief (that 
the agent's act is wrong) is true, and moreover believe it because she believes it is true, and 
not because the belief is important to society, or useful, or salutary.71  Perhaps such truth-
purposed belief requires that the holder of the belief always be on the lookout for any 
indication that her belief is not true, or in error, and that would require her to consider and 
tolerate the agent's assertions of contradictory incorrect beliefs.  
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But this argument does not reach Mill's conclusion, either, and for the same basic reason. 
While the observer, in order to have knowledge, must believe what she believes because she 
believes it is true, and not for some other reason such as because it is useful or pious, this 
fact does not entail the "complete liberty" for agents to disagree that Mill asserts.  The goal of 
truth in belief-acceptance, coupled with fallibility, may require that the observer remain 
sensitive to new evidence concerning the truth of her belief, and require that she come to her 
true belief through a concern for truth, but it does not require her to tolerate views that she 
has already judged wrong.  She need not reconsider over and again views that she thinks are 
incorrect in order to reasonably hold her own views.  Mill's various remarks about the fallibility 
of knowledge fail to address this basic point: "if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if 
there be a better truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it; and in 
the meantime we may rely on having attained such approach to truth as is possible in our own 
day.  That is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being, and this the sole way of 
attaining it."72  But the observer need only keep her own lists open for new arguments or 
proof; she need not tolerate the agent's wrong arguments and spurious proof in order to 
establish her knowledge.  While it may be true that "the only way in which a human being can 
make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about 
it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at 
by every character of mind,"73 that is relevant only to the observer's own truth-seeking beliefs, 
not to the agent's liberty to think and propose alternatives that the observer has already 
considered and knows are wrong.  The fallibility and revisability of the observer's knowledge 
does not seem to require that she avoid interfering with an agent's wrong views or actions, 
nor does the observer's interference imply that she interferes for any reason other than 
because she believes that her belief that the agent's act is wrong is correct.
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3.2 JUSTIFICATION AND PROGRESS
Mill's second division - where the observer is correct that the agent's act is wrong - is more 
concerned with whether the observer's true belief may fail to be knowledge because the 
observer's belief that the agent's act is wrong is not justified, and it is here that the case for a 
wide liberty for contesting points of view may seem stronger.  A belief, even if true, may fail to 
be knowledge because it is not completely justified.  If I correctly believe that you have ten 
dollars in your pocket, then despite the fact that my belief is true, I do not know you have ten 
dollars because I am merely lucky in my guess.  I have no reason to believe that you have ten 
dollars in your pocket.  Moreover, a slight justification for belief is not enough; one's 
justification must be robust enough to support knowledge.  If I believe you are now at home 
because you are usually there at this time of day, then even if you are indeed at home right 
now, I do not know you are at home because I have not verified that you are, and so I cannot 
rule out the possibility that you are out on an errand, or somewhere else.74  Hence even if an 
observer's belief that an agent's view or act is wrong is correct, if the observer is not also 
completely justified in believing the agent's act is wrong, then the observer does not know the 
act is wrong, and her interference is unwarranted.  If I correctly believe that you are illegally 
breaking into a house, but I am unaware that only yesterday you lost ownership of the house 
in a divorce settlement, then my belief is true merely by happenstance, and though true, is not 
knowledge.  If I interfere, then I do so without the knowledge that would properly warrant my 
interference, despite the fact that you are doing something that is indeed wrong.  
These initial epistemological observations about justification as a necessary condition for 
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knowledge are relatively uncontroversial.  But Mill extends the idea of what sort of justification 
a true belief requires in order to constitute knowledge considerably further.  Mill argues that 
not only must the observer's true belief be positively justified, but that justification also 
requires that the observer must be able to defend her belief in debate; she must be able to 
make "a tenable defense" against at least the superficial objections of an opponent who 
disagrees.  If she cannot defend her belief against such an opponent, then her "true opinion 
abides in the mind ... as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument - 
this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being.  This is not knowing the 
truth."75  Even amongst educated people who are familiar with the grounds of their belief, and 
who could probably offer a passable argument in support of their belief, if "they have never 
thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them, and 
considered what such persons may have to say; [then] consequently they do not, in any 
proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess."76  Mill grants 
that some truths, such as the mathematical truths of geometry, may be known without 
considering the arguments against them, since difference of opinion regarding such truths is 
not possible, but he asserts that even knowing natural scientific truths requires the 
consideration of alternative views, and to a much greater degree do moral and political truths 
require such consideration of alternatives.77  To the objection that most people would not be 
able to defend their true beliefs in this way, and so they should be able to rely on authority 
when confronted with the arguments of an ingenious opponent, Mill responds that the very 
meaning of a doctrine lies in its grounds, and that if a person does not understand the 
reasons for and against a doctrine, then that person does not really know it, even if she is 
otherwise justified in believing it is true on reliable authority.78
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On coherence theories of knowledge, the process of justification takes up a fundamentally 
disputational pattern of challenge-response in which justification continues until an agreement 
is reached between disputing parties.  Relying on the pragmatic, social context of knowledge, 
coherence theories thereby resolve the problem of infinite regress in which one belief justifies 
another, which is justified by another, and another, without end, because as a practical matter 
justification is only required to proceed to the point of agreement.79  So if Mill is thinking in 
terms of a coherence theory of justification, he may see a need for the observer claiming 
knowledge to be able to answer any challenge that an agent may make to the observer's 
knowledge claim; otherwise, the justification of the observer's claim is not complete.  But even 
if justification does require that the observer meet all challenges and, therefore (possibly), 
must fully comprehend the grounds of her belief, as Mill asserts, nonetheless this process 
need not recur for the observer every single time she encounters an agent holding a wrong 
view.  The observer must herself understand the grounds for her knowledge, and if an agent 
asserts a challenge that the observer has not already considered, then she may be required 
to properly process that challenge with a suitable response, but if the agent asserts a 
challenge that the observer has already considered and dismissed in her best judgment, then 
whether the observer ignores or suppresses the agent's assertion is irrelevant to the 
justification of the observer's knowledge.  The requirement that the observer understand the 
grounds of her belief does not therefore lead to the conclusion that agents acting on wrong 
views should be free of interference in asserting and acting upon them.  The observer may 
interfere with an agent doing something foolish and wrong, while fully retaining her 
understanding of the grounds of her true belief.  
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Perhaps Mill believes that if the observer were justified in believing that the agent's act is 
wrong, then the observer should be able to transfer that knowledge to the agent, and so 
interference would be unnecessary because the agent would then avoid the act on her own 
volition.  If the observer could not convince the agent that her act is wrong, then that by itself 
is some evidence that the observer's knowledge is not completely justified.  Suppose the 
observer hears a daimonic voice in her head that imparts true information about the good of 
other people but never explains why that is their good.80  The observer would not be able to 
convince the agent that her act is wrong, despite being correct, because the observer does 
not understand the grounds for her belief; her belief lacks justification.  But it is not always 
possible to communicate one's justified knowledge to another person.  Moral knowledge is 
not scientific in the testable, falsifiable sense, although for Mill it is empirical like all other 
forms of knowledge.  If justification is a matter of coherence and personal acceptance, then 
the observer may often be unable to communicate all the various experiences and insights 
she has had that led her to the knowledge of the wrongness of the agent's act.81  The 
observer may be able to teach the agent why her act is wrong, but it is likely that for many 
wrong acts, the agent will have to learn on her own why they are wrong.  Most people have 
already learned a tremendous amount about morality from their families and their culture, and 
that is quite possibly all that can be learned without first-hand experience.  Moreover, it is odd 
to think that one's justification for one's knowledge depends so critically upon how adept one 
is at convincing other people that one knows.  The observer may simply be a bad teacher or a 
poor communicator.  
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Mill argues in his third division - where observer and agent are each partly right - that 
knowledge of truth progresses in a dialectical fashion when it proceeds at all, though in 
practice "progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutes one partial and 
incomplete truth for another."82  If truth proceeds dialectically, then that may support Mill's 
disputational model of justification because any moral view will always be lacking some 
aspect of the truth that a close consideration of a contending view will reveal.  "On every 
subject on which difference of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck 
between two sets of conflicting reasons."83  But again, even if that is the case, the observer 
need only engage in dialectical debate at whatever point of progress she herself has reached 
in her knowledge; she need not listen to or tolerate wrong views or acts which she has 
already previously encountered and from which she has already gleaned whatever limited 
truth they contain.  She may suppress and ignore those views, while remaining open to new 
views, without threatening the justification for her knowledge, even given that truth can only 
be approached dialectically.  If she does not expressly justify her view to the agent, then the 
agent may fail to know that her doctrine or act is wrong or why or what about it is wrong, but 
the observer's knowledge is no less justified, even given Mill's disputational, dialectical model. 
If, on the other hand, we took Mill's occasional asides about how difficult truth is to achieve to 
mean that he is covertly a relativist who holds that there is no way to judge between partial 
and incomplete truths,84 and so "progress" indeed always merely "substitutes" one wrong view 
for another without getting any closer to truth, then while it is true that the observer would then 
have no knowledge that the agent's act is wrong and so no justification on that basis for 
interfering, the observer would then also seem to have no basis for not interfering with the 
agent's act, since moral rights themselves would seem to have no basis.85  
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We have seen the same fundamental objection to Mill's epistemic argument reappear in each 
of these three divisions, and throughout Mill's discussion.  The validity of the observer's 
knowledge does not depend upon its justification to the agent.  The observer must remain 
open to new views in the interest of obtaining truth in order to be properly cognizant of her 
own fallibility, but that does not mean that she must be open to any opposing view that any 
agent proposes, if the observer has already considered and rejected the agent's view as 
false.  The observer may suppress such wrong views and interfere with agents who act upon 
them without assuming her own infallibility.  Moreover, the observer must understand and 
respond to reasonable challenges to her knowledge in order to justify it, but that does not 
mean that she must listen and respond to any view of any agent who asserts views that the 
observer has already considered and rejected.  Even on a strongly disputational model of 
justification, the observer is not required to debate any agent with any view; the observer's 
knowledge is sufficiently justified if she has met only legitimate competitors to her view. 
Finally, even supposing a dialectical model of truth, the observer need only consider those 
truths that she has not previously digested in order to advance her understanding of the full 
truth; she need not reconsider any truth that any agent proposes.  Hence the epistemological 
requirements that the observer recognize her own fallibility, believe what she believes 
because it is true, and properly justify her belief, even together with a dialectical account of 
progress towards truth, do not yield anything like the wide-ranging liberty for agents to 
propose and act upon their individual views that Mill hopes to defend.  
Given how rather obvious this fundamental objection is, it is somewhat surprising that Mill 
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couches his argument so expressly in epistemological terms.  Indeed commentators for the 
most part have ignored the explicitly epistemological cast of Mill's argument.  I have already 
described one common approach, which regards Mill's essay as a defense of liberty for the 
purpose of promoting individual autonomy.  Waldron, in a slight variation on that approach, 
interprets Mill to propose a moral ideal of "committed open-mindedness," in which ethical 
confrontation between differing points of view spurs new ideas and sharpens old ones, 
resulting in autonomous lives lived with a "lively and committed spirit."86  On Waldron's 
interpretation, Mill argues that suppressing and interfering with even wrong views dampens 
ethical confrontation, and leads to a stagnant society full of people who are not meaningful 
autonomous.  But Mill explicitly discusses "fallibility" and "certainty," and the importance of 
understanding the "grounds" of one's opinions, of what a "rational" being who is "corrigible" 
can know, and of what "knowing the truth" means, and the nature of truth.  Is there some way 
to adjust Mill's epistemic argument so as to cure the fundamental objection that the observer's 
knowledge does not really seem to depend on the agent's liberty to disagree?
3.3 THE AGENT'S KNOWLEDGE
Mill's discussion does suggest an alternative way to epistemologically justify the right of 
individual liberty: interference with an agent's act because the act is wrong is not justifiable 
unless the agent knows her act is wrong.  If the agent does not know that her wrong act is 
wrong, then the observer's interference for the purpose of preventing the act's wrongness is 
not warranted.  Most of Mill's observations about knowledge would be true if he were talking 
about a single person's knowledge, that is, the agent's knowledge.  For example, Mill asserts 
that "complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which 
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justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action,"87 which is a relatively good description 
of how any fallible knower should herself treat her own beliefs: she should not assume any of 
her beliefs to be infallibly true but, instead, grant herself the complete liberty to reexamine 
them in the light of new countervailing or contradicting evidence.  If she does not regard 
herself as free to potentially revise or discard her views when new evidence appears, then 
she holds her views on faith, or she assumes her own infallibility.  The ambiguity of Mill's 
statement gives rise to this interpretation, and makes it sound more convincing than it is; if 
Mill had explicitly said that granting others the liberty to contradict our opinion is what justifies 
us in assuming our opinion is true, then the statement immediately raises the question as to 
why or how hearing others' (possibly obtuse or inept) assertions should make so much 
difference to the truth of our own opinions.  It is our own freedom and willingness to revise our 
opinions that gives us what limited assurance we have that our opinions are true, not others' 
freedom to express opposing opinions.  Moreover, sometimes Mill seems to be talking about 
how the observer's interference might vitiate the agent's knowledge, which makes more 
sense, rather than how the observer's interference with the agent would vitiate the observer's 
knowledge, which seems somewhat mysterious.  Mill asserts for example that "it is not the 
feeling sure of a doctrine which I call an assumption of infallibility... it is the undertaking to 
decide that question for others, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the 
contrary side."88  While it is possible that an interfering observer would assume her own 
infallibility when preventing an agent from hearing a contrary view, it would make more sense 
to say that the observer assumes her own infallibility were she to refuse or prevent herself  
from hearing a contrary view.  An infallible observer would have no need or desire herself to 
hear contrary views, but whether she allows the agent to hear contrary views or not seems 
irrelevant to whether the observer's knowledge is fallible or not.  Hearing contrary views is 
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quite relevant, however, to whether the agent can establish her own knowledge of her view. 
And anyway an observer who assumed she only fallibly knew what is good may be just as 
willing to enforce her view as an infallible observer without bothering to explain it to the agent. 
Indeed, it is the infallible observer who would seem more motivated to let the agent hear all 
sides, so that the agent might more readily comply with the observer's view.
Finally, Mill sometimes slips into language about the observer's "authority" to interfere with the 
agent's efforts to acquire knowledge and understanding, implying that the observer's authority 
to interfere depends upon that agent's knowledge, rather than on the observer's own 
knowledge.  For example, Mill asserts that "those who desire to suppress [an opinion], of 
course deny its truth; but they are not infallible.  They have no authority to decide the question 
for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging."89  But if the 
observer's authority to interfere depends on the observer's knowledge of what is good, then 
there is no need to grant agents the means of judging for themselves when those agents 
judge wrongly.  If agents are deprived of the opportunity to consider and judge an opinion for 
themselves, then they would not be able to establish their own knowledge of what the 
observer already knows - for the reasons Mill so ably outlines: if they believed it, they would 
do so blindly, and without a suitable justification in the light of alternatives, and deprived of 
part of the full truth - but the observer would still nonetheless know what she knows.  And 
again: "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the 
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if 
he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind."90  Mill goes on to explain that the 
reason humankind must not silence the lone dissenting individual is that the individual may 
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very well be correct in her opinion.  But, as we have seen, and as Mill ultimately concedes, 
the mere theoretical possibility of error by itself is no reason to avoid interfering with opinions 
or acts that we (admittedly fallibly) know are wrong; if it is our knowledge that the individual's 
opinion and acts are wrong that grants us that authority, then its mere fallibility does not 
undercut that authority.  Mill's statement makes sense, however, if our authority for interfering 
depends upon the one dissenting individual's knowledge that her opinion is wrong.  If the 
individual sincerely and with some justification dissents, then presumably she does not herself 
know that her opinion is wrong, even if we do know it is, and then our interference would not 
be justified, if our authority to interfere depends upon the agent's knowledge that her opinion 
is wrong.
3.4 FREEDOM 
"The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good 
in our own way..."  J.S. Mill, "On Liberty," p. 50.
These considerations suggest a novel way of reading Mill's Harm Principle, and indeed of 
understanding Mill's entire essay in On Liberty.  Freedom is choosing how one shall live 
according to one's own progressive knowledge of what is morally good, so long as one avoids 
harming others.91  Since the individual's interest in freedom is of sufficient weight and 
importance to hold others to be under moral duties to protect and promote it, the individual 
possesses a right to freedom.92  Any restrictions on an individual's freedom must be justifiable 
to that individual.  Restrictions that are imposed to prevent harm to others are justifiable to 
that individual.93  Restrictions on harmless acts that are imposed because the acts are wrong, 
however, are only justifiable to that individual if  she herself knows  that her acts are wrong  . 
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Hence if an individual does not know that a harmless act she performs is morally wrong 
despite her best efforts to understand why, and in fact justifiably believes that her act is not 
wrong, then interference with that act because it is wrong is not justified even if the act is 
indeed wrong.
The Harm Principle, then, may be understood as a specification or instantiation of the more 
general principle that any restrictions on an individual's freedom must be justifiable to that 
individual, an idea that has deep roots in the liberal tradition of thought.94  The Harm Principle 
simply specifies a set of restrictions that are presumptively justifiable to the restricted 
individual: those that prevent harm to others.  Restrictions on harmless acts are more difficult 
to justify to the individual.  The general principle does not by itself, therefore, establish that an 
agent should be free to commit harmlessly wrong acts, or a RTDW, because the wrongness 
of the act may be thought a sufficient justification to the agent to impose restrictions on her 
freedom to commit the act.  Indeed, that is why a RTDW is a paradoxical intuition, because 
the wrongness of the agent's act seems to provide a prima facie moral reason and 
justification for interfering that would seem good even to the agent.  To establish a RTDW 
under the general principle, one needs some argument showing that the wrongness of an 
agent's act does not imply that interference with the act is justifiable to that agent.  Mill's 
reoriented epistemic argument fills this need.  Even if an act is wrong and an interfering 
observer knows that the act is wrong, if the agent does not herself know that her act is wrong, 
then interference with the act is not justified to her.  The agent does not understand why she 
should not be free to commit what she herself does not believe or see any justification for 
believing is a wrong act.  She has the right to pursue what she believes is her "own good," 
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according to her own understanding of that good, that is, in her "own way."  If we reoriented 
Mill's epistemic argument in this way, then Mill's real innovation here may lie in thinking of the 
traditional liberal requirement that restrictions on individual freedom must be "justified" to the 
restricted agent as laying out an epistemic standard for that justification, at least where such 
restrictions are imposed because the agent's act is wrong, and the act does no harm.  
If an observer interferes with an agent's act because that act is wrong, then in order to justify 
that interference to the agent, the observer must justify the wrongness of the act to the agent 
such that the agent would then herself know that the act is wrong.  Such an effort would 
probably require the observer to convincingly explain to the agent why her act is wrong, so 
that the agent might understand the reasons that her act is wrong.  This makes some sense 
of Mill's arguments in Division II, where he insisted that the justification of knowledge requires 
that a person be able to articulate the grounds for her opinion in the light of the arguments of 
able, adversarial advocates for contrary views.  Such a requirement seems unnecessary to 
justify one's knowledge to oneself, and moreover would not require a person to debate any 
argument proposed by anyone, especially if one had heard the argument before.  But if it is 
the agent's knowledge of the act's wrongness that matters in justifying interference, then the 
observer would have to respond to any contrary argument any agent submits in order to 
justify interference, even if the observer had already done so a thousand times before, so that 
the agent could herself come to an understanding of the act's wrongness.  And the observer 
knowing the full grounds of her opinion in the way that Mill insists would better enable the 
observer to justify the wrongness of the agent's act to the agent.  To justify the wrongness of 
the agent's act to the agent, the observer must be able to answer each and every reasonable 
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objection that the agent makes.  
Hence the epistemic cast of Mill's main arguments in Chapter Two, "Of the Liberty of Thought 
and Discussion," begins to make sense as a response to the objection that if an act is wrong, 
then that by itself should be sufficient justification to the agent for the observer to intervene. 
This objection flows naturally from a consideration of the general principle that implicitly 
underlies the Harm Principle presented in the introductory Chapter One, that restrictions on 
an agent's freedom should be justifiable to that agent.  Mill argues that restrictions on 
(harmless) wrong acts are only justifiable to the agent if the agent knows they are wrong, and 
describes various ways that knowledge of an act's wrongness may fail.  Chapter Three, then, 
"Of Individuality, As One of the Elements of Well-Being," which commentators have often read 
as making out an entirely different argument for liberty from that made in Chapter Two, is in 
fact the next logical step for Mill, then, because Chapter Three describes how individuals 
come to possess knowledge of what is morally good.  Mill argues there that people are 
ethically progressive beings: we choose different ways of life as we come to a progressively 
better understanding of what is morally good, and what is morally right or wrong.  We come to 
that knowledge by exercising our "human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative 
feeling, mental activity, and ... moral preference" in making autonomous choices as to how to 
live, and then progressively learning from evaluating those choices.  If an individual never 
makes such autonomous choices, then she "gains no practice either in discerning or in 
desiring what is best."95  Individuals should engage in "experiments of living" such that "the 
worth of different modes of life should be proved practically."96  As children people should be 
taught what is morally right and wrong, so as to "know and benefit by the ascertained results 
64
of human experience," but upon adulthood "it is the privilege and proper condition of a human 
being... to use and interpret experience in his own way."97
In a favorite metaphor, Mill regards human nature as "a tree, which requires to grow and 
develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a 
living thing."98  The inward forces that help an individual achieve her own moral good are her 
efforts to understand that good.  Mill thinks of a human being's moral good in a way that 
recalls how pragmatists think of truth as an idealization of the conditions of inquiry: what is 
good is what arises spontaneously in an ideally limpid state of self-understanding, just as 
what is true is what is revealed in ideal conditions of inquiry.  While it is possible to conceive 
of a true self that is known better to an expert psychologist or guru than it is known to the 
individual, the individual cannot be freer expressing the truth of the psychologist or guru than 
that self of which she is aware.  If the guru's truth is truer for her, she must first understand 
that truth herself for any expression of it to be free.  If the guru or psychologist undertakes to 
enforce a moral truth upon the individual that she does not understand, then that enforcement 
violates her freedom, even if it is indeed the truth.  
3.5 A RIGHT TO KNOWINGLY DO WRONG ON THE EPISTEMIC ACCOUNT
Mill rejects a moral right to free expression where "want of candour, or malignity, bigotry, or 
intolerance of feeling manifest themselves."99  But since "to argue sophistically, to suppress 
facts or arguments, to misstate the elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite 
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opinion" is common even when arguments are made in good faith, "it is rarely possible on 
adequate grounds, conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable."100 
Mill asserts that "intemperate" advocacy, advocacy that is for example sarcastic or rude or ad 
hominem, is not immoral and may in fact be useful to clarifying one's commitments, so long 
as the intemperance does not rise to the level of lies, hate, or bigotry.  Mill's remarks come 
primarily in the context of a concern for how an individual might misrepresent an opponent's 
view in the advocacy of her own, which Mill for the most part presumes that the individual 
holds in good faith; however, his remarks apply just as well when the individual misrepresents 
her own view for the purpose of defending immoral behavior that she knows is wrong.
Hence Mill does not believe that individuals have a right to intentionally espouse or do what 
they know is wrong.  They have a right to be wrong in good faith, and to ignorantly assert and 
experiment with a wrong doctrine, but they do not have a right to lie or deceive.  This 
conclusion accords with Mill's epistemic argument that restrictions on an individual's freedom 
to prevent her from committing harmlessly wrong acts are justified if the individual herself 
knows the acts are wrong.  If the individual knows that her act is wrong, as is the case when 
the individual lies or deceives, then interference with her act is justified to her.  Mill also marks 
out views and acts committed out of bigotry or hate as unprotected.  Such motives for acting 
are not truth-seeking, and an individual who was primarily motivated by them in committing 
her wrong acts is probably aware that her acts are wrong, or would be aware they are wrong 
if she considered them in good faith.  Individuals have the freedom to pursue their own good 
in their own way, even if they are mistaken about that good and so commit wrongful acts; they 
are not free to maliciously do wrong out of hate and bigotry without any regard for whether 
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their acts are morally wrong or not.  
The paradoxical moral intuition of a RTDW flows from a keen appreciation of the individual's 
interest in living according to her own understanding of what is morally good, even if her 
understanding is flawed.  Restrictions on the liberty of the individual to live her life according 
to her own understanding of the moral good must be justifiable to her.  If an individual agent 
does not herself know that her act is wrong, or understand the reasons her act is wrong, 
therefore, then interference with that act against the agent's will is not justified, even if the act 
is indeed wrong.  This conception therefore deprives cases where an agent exercises her 
freedom with no regard for what is morally good from the protections of moral rights.  In such 
cases, the agent is not interested in pursuing the good to the best of her knowledge, but is 
instead malicious or selfish or otherwise indifferent to what is morally good while at the same 
time claiming a moral right to freely commit immoral acts that she knows are wrong.  Such 
cases are an abuse of freedom as J.S. Mill conceived of it, as that of "pursuing our own good 
in our own way."  Such agents do not pursue their own good; instead, they pursue what they 
know is wrong.
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